We have no absolutely conclusive evidence that there is a physical world and we have no absolutely conclusive evidence either that we exist. But we have good inductive evidence for both assumptions.' I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christina Ladd Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist and was surprised there were no others.* This paper will examine the problem of why it is that philosophers tend to say such strange things. Philosophy is perhaps most closely associated in the minds of those who have had a passing acquaintance with the subject with the problems of the existence of the external world and of other minds. It is not terribly surprising, then, that philosophers have had a reputation for becoming involved in trivial and inconsequential issues. Philosophers, of course, remain convinced of the seriousness of their work and appear to be quite willing to endure a lack of understanding on the part of the general public, perhaps believing the contempt of the mob to be the price of genius. And yet, we sometimes find philosophers saying things that are so extremely odd, if not downright silly, that we might feel that perhaps there is something to the suspicions of the public.
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Since the time of Descartes, who can truly be said to be the father of a good many epistemological problems that are still with us, there has been a tendency for philosophers to view justification primarily as a private activity and only secondarily as a public or social activity. This is a fundamental error that gives rise to such traditional staples of epistemology as the problem of the existence of the external world, the problem of other minds, and to such positions as those expressed in the above quotations.
In what follows it will be attempted (1) to illustrate how the belief that justification is primarily a private activity arises, But, granted that justification has both public and private aspects, we are faced with the problem of determining which aspect is prior. The problem comes down to this: Is justification primarily a private, subjective activity and only secondarily a public, social one, or vice versa? Does justification originate in individuals or does it originate only in a social context? Now in the introduction it was stated that many of the traditional problems of epistemology can arise from viewing justification primarily as a private activity and only secondarily as a public activity. The activity of private justification is viewed as being somehow prior to the public justification of a knowledge claim. In this section we wish to illustrate, through an examination of the elements of the traditional analysis of knowledge, how this belief can arise. So let us now proceed to attempt to reconstruct the general lines of reasoning that can lead philosophers to this conclusion.
Keith Lehrer, one of the foremost proponents of the sceptical position in contemporary epistemology, provides us with a number of statements with which we can construct arguments for the fundamentally private nature of justification.
It seems to be the case that justification must be primarily a private activity, for at least two reasons. The first is that justification depends upon evidence and the apprehension of evidence looks to be a private matter.
It is simply true as a matter of fact that some people notice things and others do not.
Thus, even where the access to evidence is public, its acquisition-noticing it--is basically a private activity. Now since justification depends upon evidence, and since noticing evidence would seem to be a private activity, justification itself would also be a private activity.
Lehrer has emphasized the central role of evidence in justification and explicitly points out the variation in the apprehension of evidence: In whatever way a man might attempt to justify his beliefs, whether by himself or to another, he must always appeal to some belief. There is nothing other than one's belief to which one can appeal in the justification of belief.* Now since in ail cases justification deals with beliefs and since belief, as we have seeri, is a subjective element in knowledge, justificaticn will appear to be primarily a private activity.
We have now seen how the belief t: at justification is primarily a private activity ari.as. The basic paradigm is the following: a perso:. forms a belief, justifies it to himself in some way, publicly makes a knowledge claim, and, if his claim is challenged or if circumstances otherwise require it, he reproduces his private justification for others.
It cannot be denied that this is very often the case.
In fact, part of the plausibility of the position that justification is primarily a private activity stems from the fact that this paradigm does indeed represent the usual way in which knowledge is advanced. The real danger lies in taking this to be the universal paradigm for knowing. This will be discussed in the fourth section of this paper. Now we must take a look at how this paradigm generates the traditional problems of epistemology.
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We have taken an analysis of knowledge as justified true belief as a starting point and have, for the sake of argument, adopted the position that justification is primarily a private, subjective activity. Taking this as a universal paradigm for knowledge, a person must now justify to himself and 'on his own' all his beliefs before he can legitimately make any knowledge claims regarding them.
It is quite easy to see how the traditional problems of epistemology arise in the context of such a project. For one thing, the would-be knower is working with beliefs and justification.
Since in the analysis of knowledge we are considering these are subjective elements, the person is trapped in a 'circle of subjectivity' with no clear way out. He is always of necessity dealing with private 'material*. Lehrer explicitly embraces this view: 
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The validity of the deductions that Descartes makes from the cogito have rightly been subject to attack. But some philosophers have gone on to maintain that we cannot know that we exist. Hans Reichenbach, for example, concluded that the existence of the self is what he terms a 'posit', an assumption that we make on the basis of good inductive evidence that is not absolutely conclusive.
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Of course, if there are problems with the existence of the self (apart from the very real problem of the nature of the self) then there must also be problems with the existence of the external world and the existence of other minds for the would-be knower.
We can now see that when one views justification as primarily a private activity the traditional problems of epistemology arise. Now we must see if there is any way in which they can be avoided.
IV
The belief that justification is primarily private and the problems this belief generates can be avoided if we pay close attention to the activity we call justifying.
In his review of Lehrer's Knowledge, Alan White points out an important distinction. Here White claims that Lehrer . . slides-at first implicitly . . . and then explicitly . . .--from an examination of the conditions for someone's having knowledge to an ex-amination of the condition for someone's claim to have knowledge to be justified.
12
This distinction between knowing and claiming to know is very important for the matter we are considering.
For there are situations in which we would say that a person knows something and yet is unable to justify a claim to know. An obvious example would be an infant knowing her mother. This distinction would seem to suggest that justification is more pertinent to claiming to know than to knowing proper. This is important because claiming to know is something that always occurs in a social context. Once again, we do not make knowledge claims to ourselves, we simply know things. We will return to this point later.
In trying to discover exactly what justification is, we can use Gilbert Kyle's distinction between knowing that and knowing how.
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It may be objected that even granted that justification presupposes a knowing how, it is something we somehow 'intuit' how to do or that it is a natural human ability like breathing or walking and that everyone who has the ability does it with pretty much the same degree of competence. But this is obviously not the case. Some people have difficulty articulating their beliefs, let alone organizing and relating them in complex patterns or supporting them with relevant evidence. Being able to justify, then, is clearly a skill.
The question which must now be asked is, 'What is the origin of this skill? How do we develop it?' A clue comes from Wilfrid Sellars. Discussing the origin of concepts referring to inner episodes, he states that they are intersubjective, in other words, that we get them from other people in a social situation.'* Now if the very activity that we call justifying is intersubjective in its origin, then it follows that the existence of this activity presupposes the existence at some time of a community whose members make knowledge claims. The existence of such a community of people is a necessary condition for the existence of the activity of justifying. A theory of justification, then, may correctly begin by recognizing the existence of such a community as an eminently reasonable presupposition.
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We are now in a position to indicate what justification is. Justification has public and private aspects but its origin is intersubjective. As such, it is primarily a social activity.
Before we can know that a belief is justified, we must know how to go about justifying it and knowing how to justify something, i.e., how to relate a belief to other beliefs by articulating them and arranging them or how to support a belief by appeal to relevant evidence, is a skill, something we learn how to do, something we acquire as members of an epistemic community.
Once we learn how to justify our beliefs through observing other people performing justifications, we internalize the process and perform private justifications either in anticipation of a public demand for them or for our own satisfaction. ' 
